Round Table on Public Transport and Anti-terrorism Security

Summary of the main findings and follow-up actions

Mohamed Mezghani Andrea Soehnchen

Vulnerability of Public transport (1)


- PT vehicles and stations collect together high number of people
- PT systems are open and fully accessible
- Large geographical spread of PT systems
- Multiple stops and interchanges lead to passenger turn-over
- Anti-terrorism security is still at early stage of development in PT systems

Vulnerability of Public transport (2)

A potential terrorist on PT systems attack would:

- → Lead to large number of victims
- Attract worldwide media coverage
- Confuse the public and create a state of panic
- Disrupt the entire transport system
- Affect the image of public transport and discredit the State as well

Increasing number of attacks on PT systems



Terrorist attacks in PT

- Bombing (Paris 1986, 1995, 1996), (Baku 1994), (Moscow 2000)
- Fire (Daegu 2003)
- CB(RN) (Tokyo 1995)
- Kamikaze (Israel)

The issue is now International Terrorism

Risk analysis

- Systematic analysis of past incidents to get comparable data in order to learn lessons
- 2. Worldwide monitoring of threats and forwarding of relevant information
- 3. Standard procedures to handle direct threats

Preventive measures

- 1. Organisational measures & interagency collaboration
- 2. Training & information
- 3. Infrastructure & equipment

Organisational measures & inter-agency collaboration

- PT should have its own police British transport police In-house security force (Athens) Paris transport police
- Since terrorism is a public security issue there is a need for a centralised coordination with public authorities London Resilience Operational Integrated Room in Rome
- Develop Information sharing and communication protocols

Training & Information

- Convey a corporate culture of security
- Training of personnel To be prepared to prevent and react (Proactive and reactive)
- Prepare crisis communication in advance
 Internal and with other actors
- Reassurance of and collaboration with passengers

Infrastructure & Equipment

- Integrate security in the design phase but difficult to upgrade existing infrastructure
- Make vehicles and stations less "attractive" to terrorists
- Access control of restricted areas
- CCTV and other IT equipment
- Biometrics
- Emergency equipment (e.g. masks)

Preparing the response to terrorists attacks

- The response should be prepared whatever is the origin (terrorist or not): Decontamine/combat fire to restore traffic (contingency plans)
- Multi-agency collaboration
- Test equipment/processes and other elements
- Reassurance

Needs (1)

- Improve fundamental knowledge (basic notions and common definitions)
- Improve understanding of the threat, PT vulnerability and risk assessment
- Guidelines on operational procedures
- Recommendations on design standards
- Benchmarking and dissemination of good practices
- (Real-time) Information sharing

Needs (2)

- Advice and training from specialised agencies (e.g. check-lists for specific situations)
- Learn from other sectors (cf. Aviation: Annex 17, EU Security Regulation 2030, training on hijacking)
- Increasing awareness of PT sector

Constraints/Issues

- PT systems cannot have any influence on the roots of terrorism / origin of the threat
- We are PT professionals and not security agencies
- Share of responsibility with governmental agencies
- Financing: who should pay?
- How to deal with media? (Code of good practice?)
- Cyber-terrorism (is PT a potential target?)
- Is business as usual sufficient to handle extra-ordinary situations?
- How to deal with confidentiality?

Potential collaborative actions (1)

- EU should be reference background to set up actions
- The EC should play a role (proactive regulatory/legislative tools or reactive information sharing)
- PT Security expert network (compile and exchange information and experience)
- Set-up a body for monitoring and assessing the threat, attacks, responses
 → Database (indicators, good practices)
 → Neweletter (periodic information brief)
 - → Newsletter (periodic information brief)

Potential collaborative actions (2)

- Team of independent experts/inspectors to analyse system vulnerability (Pilot programme)
- EU training centre on operational responses (equipped with state-of-the-art installations allowing multi-threat simulation & preparation)
- Development of minimum security standards (design, procedures, equipment, etc)
 Security Cortification
 - → Security Certification
 - → Security Handbook

Potential collaborative actions (3)

- R&D projects
- Collaboration for the construction of a simulation exercise and the subsequent debriefing (under the leadership of the host agency and coordination by UITP?)
- Envisage relationship with the European Crime prevention network
- Improve knowledge on CBRN strategies and technics

Keep momentum and continue the work initiated by this group